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Table 7

(a) Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables: those who thought that immigration would depress wages on average

	EU	AT	DE	DK	ES	FI	FR	GR	IE	IT	LU	NL	PT	SE	UK
employ	-0.043	-0.448 ***	-0.092	0.088	-0.197	-0.019	-0.009	-0.019	-0.083	0.061	0.338	0.188	0.106	0.237	-0.218
	0.055	0.161	0.147	0.294	0.155	0.158	0.158	0.025	0.104	0.370	0.187	0.186	0.052	0.373	0.213
employ x isb	0.038	0.250 **	0.025	-0.089	0.061	0.023	0.085	0.018	0.133	0.011	-0.454 *	-0.115	-0.086 *	-0.228	0.210
	0.042	0.126	0.131	0.219	0.107	0.137	0.094	0.019	0.128	0.312	0.265	0.202	0.044	0.213	0.206
unemploy	0.117 **	0.099	0.040	-0.570	0.271 *	-0.091	0.244 **	-0.080	-0.058	-0.631 ***	∆	0.326	0.055	0.114	0.143
	0.055	0.194	0.130	0.113	0.102	0.130	0.084	0.122	0.282	0.069		0.064	0.184	0.353	0.180
unemploy x isb	-0.025	-0.073	0.053	1.011	-0.146 **	0.122	-0.155 **	0.047	0.060	1.413 ***	∆	-0.412	-0.174	-0.236	-0.195
	0.043	0.183	0.087	0.691	0.073	0.084	0.065	0.035	0.263	0.328		0.349	0.140	0.222	0.202
isb	0.004	0.025	-0.015	-0.133	0.016	-0.083 **	0.024	0.004	-0.097 **	-0.103	0.265 ***	0.026	0.026	0.015	-0.065
	0.013	0.038	0.033	0.081	0.029	0.039	0.021	0.004	0.047	0.177	0.098	0.057	0.020	0.048	0.061
relinc	-0.004	-0.015	0.007	-0.023	0.035	-0.024	-0.019	0.001	-0.014	-0.073	-0.073	0.016	0.025 ***	0.094 **	0.000
	0.009	0.011	0.025	0.059	0.022	0.020	0.016	0.008	0.027	0.045	0.071	0.047	0.009	0.041	0.020
ed0	0.100 *	0.218	t	t	0.138	-0.174	0.041	0.012	0.204	-0.012	0.245	-0.012	0.046	f(2)	f(1)
	0.049	0.099			0.095	0.136	0.109	0.037	0.160	0.163	0.195	0.263	0.105
ed1	0.054 **	0.024	0.128 **	0.303 ***	0.064	0.002	0.028	0.014	0.068	-0.023	0.040	0.047	-0.094 ***	0.149	-0.002
	0.026	0.049	0.055	0.059	0.079	0.037	0.062	0.025	0.049	0.118	0.088	0.049	0.017	0.094	0.039
ed3	-0.142 ***	-0.066	-0.052	-0.170 **	-0.001	-0.065 ***	-0.241 ***	-0.092 ***	-0.054	-0.103	-0.151	-0.142 *	-0.162 *	-0.090	-0.286 ***
	0.036	0.134	0.052	0.083	0.110	0.017	0.035	0.040	0.088	0.244	0.126	0.087	0.089	0.121	0.068
media	-0.010	0.005	-0.009	0.017	0.036	0.000	-0.018	-0.003	0.010	-0.087 *	0.021	0.005	-0.012	0.014	-0.022
	0.009	0.040	0.022	0.038	0.032	0.021	0.026	0.012	0.020	0.051	0.021	0.024	0.027	0.025	0.014
friend1	-0.122 ***	0.000	-0.143 ***	0.037	-0.185 **	-0.132 **	-0.135 ***	-0.033	-0.006	-0.211 *	0.029	-0.059	-0.157 ***	0.026	-0.019
	0.019	0.073	0.026	0.075	0.077	0.064	0.051	0.021	0.059	0.106	0.103	0.072	0.066	0.084	0.047
friend2	-0.144 ***	-0.324 ***	-0.139 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.140	-0.197 **	-0.142 *	-0.061	-0.135 *	-0.311	0.007	-0.173 *	-0.265 **	0.115	-0.016
	0.033	0.083	0.040	0.096	0.114	0.094	0.081	0.054	0.066	0.171	0.112	0.095	0.136	0.075	0.089
racist	0.088 ***	0.008	0.101 ***	0.100 **	-0.138 ***	-0.016	0.073	0.000	0.091 **	0.199 ***	-0.097 *	0.198 ***	0.074 **	0.151 ***	0.144 ***
	0.018	0.064	0.033	0.044	0.027	0.023	0.053	0.019	0.036	0.077	0.058	0.053	0.037	0.049	0.035
citizen	0.083	0.357 *	0.238 ***	-0.283 *	f(5)	0.263 ***	-0.078	0.167 *	-0.059	f(1)	0.264 **	-0.008	0.089	-0.235	0.032
	0.055	0.211	0.066	0.121		0.080	0.098	0.106	0.103		0.110	0.219	0.181	0.318	0.195
ethnic	-0.092 *	0.055	-0.186 *	0.195	-0.080	-0.214	0.001	-0.093 ***	0.186	t	-0.302 **	0.073	s(4)	0.388	-0.095
	0.048	0.089	0.093	0.233	0.130	0.183	0.161	0.027	0.342		0.133	0.105		0.450	0.082
fparent	-0.140 ***	0.142 **	0.027	0.041	0.201 **	-0.058	-0.251 ***	-0.093 ***	0.146	-0.438 *	0.009	-0.057	-0.008	-0.077	-0.245 ***
	0.043	0.051	0.055	0.120	0.073	0.057	0.075	0.041	0.102	0.138	0.100	0.105	0.182	0.099	0.078
female	0.023	0.023	-0.038	-0.087	0.007	-0.021	0.093 **	-0.023	0.005	0.154 **	0.056	0.011	0.048	0.036	0.015
	0.018	0.049	0.030	0.066	0.049	0.038	0.041	0.023	0.043	0.073	0.082	0.059	0.051	0.059	0.044
age	0.001 *	0.002	0.001 **	0.000	0.000	0.005 ***	0.002	0.001 ***	-0.002 *	0.003	-0.001	-0.002 *	0.005 ***	-0.002	0.000
	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.001
log pseudolikelihood	-3881.680	-198.120	-483.073	-140.281	-156.771	-381.804	-320.874	-340.813	-338.247	-85.535	-143.813	-218.326	-225.448	-118.934	-333.964
McFadden's (1974) LRI	0.095	0.104	0.051	0.118	0.074	0.070	0.104	0.101	0.032	0.171	0.104	0.065	0.105	0.099	0.121
R²p	0.169	0.071	0.148	0.142	0.178	0.066	0.248	-0.016	0.023	0.236	0.100	-0.023	0.000	0.052	0.153
Sum of PCP	1.279	1.236	1.193	1.217	1.254	1.151	1.290	1.047	1.093	1.267	0.189	1.076	1.119	1.101	1.257
obs.	6311.000	375.000	735.000	231.000	259.000	656.000	519.000	1007.000	517.000	149.000	233.000	362.000	423.000	242.000	590.000

t All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.

s(n) n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n) n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.

∆ The variable is dropped in estimation due to perfect multicollinearity without 4 perfectly predicting observations: see Stata reference, technical notes on "logit", pp.98-101 (second case).

* 10% ** 5% *** 1%

The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197). Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.

Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.

For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.

Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.

For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.

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