Table 7: Overview for Children of Non-Fostering Households
Panel A: Summary Statistics |
Panel B: School Enrollment Transitions (1999-2000) | ||
(1) Children of Non- Fostering Households |
(2) Children of Non- _____________________________________________________________Fostering Households | ||
Enrollment Rate (% currently enrolled) |
18.3 |
Never enrolled (Not enrolled 1999, Not enrolled 2000) |
[Column %] |
Average Age |
9.4 |
Discontinued Enrollment (Enrolled1999, Not enrolled 2000) |
2.8 |
Median Age |
9 |
Newly Enrolled (Not enrolled 1999, Enrolled 2000) |
6.1 |
Percentage Male |
50.9 |
Enrolled both years (Enrolled 1999, Enrolled 2000) |
14.7 |
Number of Children |
^^470 |
Number of Children |
^^423 |
Panel C: Difference in Differences Comparing Average School Enrollment a
Foster Children (N=202) |
Children of Non- Fostering Households ____________(N=423) |
Difference | |
Pre-Fostering |
0.124 |
0.175 |
-0.051 |
[0.023] |
[0.018] |
[0.032] | |
Post-Fostering |
0.154 |
0.208 |
-0.054 |
[0.025] |
[0.020] |
[0.034] | |
Difference |
0.030 |
0.033 |
-0.003 |
[0.034] |
[0.026] |
[0.046] |
Note: Statistics in the table are based on children aged 5 years and older. Panel A contains summary statistics, similar to Table 1, for the children
of non-fostering households, and Panel B contains school enrollment transition information, similar to Table 2, for these children. In Panel B, I
use 1999 and 2000 enrollment rates for these children, but results are similar using 1998 and 1999 enrollment rates. In Panel B, I exclude 47
children aged 4 in 1999 because they are too young to be enrolled. Data source: Author’s survey.
a Panel C presents difference in differences results comparing average school enrollment for foster children with children from non-fostering
households using pre and post-fostering enrollment for the foster children and 1999 and 2000 enrollment for the other children, with similar results
using 1998 and 1999 enrollment for these other children.
33
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