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ambition are more likely to use legislation as a political device, in order to further their
goals. At the side of gubernatorial candidates, the use of legislation seems not to be a
resource that deserves a strategic use. The apparent paradox is that, while a 20% of the
117,000 analyzed bills have the province of its sponsor as a target; just a 9% of these
drafts refer the municipalities of the proposer's home province. Part of the explanation
of this apparent contradiction might lie in the mentioned expectation of the default
behavior. While targeting the home municipality has sense for most politicians; their
careers would depend on these constituents' decisions just in the case they expected a
municipal-level position. Whenever legislators try to defend their municipal reputation
or increase it for further executive races, they tend to use bills strategically. On the
contrary, politicians that do expect a province-level or even a national elected position
(even legislative reelection!) need to show some capital in the home province. Hence,
regardless of gubernatorial ambition, legislators tend to inflate the submission of
provincial bills.
Thus, should I infer a selective use of legislative resources, depending on
patterns of ambition? This seems a reasonable statement. If I had information similar to
that gathered by Crisp and Desposato (2005) about the yearly miles flown by each
candidate, I might discover that legislators that expect a gubernatorial candidacy travel
more than prospective mayors. As the scope and complexity of the office change,
strategic behavior is likely to do so as well.