The name is absent

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Results

As Table 6.10 shows, the empirical analysis provides strong support for my first
hypothesis. The coefficient of the covariate of mayoral candidate is positive and very
significant in both models. Once computed the expected increase in the likelihood of
submitting local legislation, results become even more conclusive. Whenever a deputy
was immediately seeking a mayoral position, the chances of local bill drafting increase
between 39% and 42%, controlled at different values of the other relevant covariates. As
in the previous chapter, variation in partisanship does not push predicted probabilities
too far from each other. As well as the defensive hypothesis was supported in the
previous chapter, it seems that municipal ambition also triggers strategic behavior
towards constituents in the crurent models.

Findings concerning hypothesis 6.3 work against the predicted direction just in
the clustered SE model, with a negative sign and statistical significance. Once again, as
in the case of previous background, the evidence suggests that the enounced direction is
not empirically verifiable. That negative finding deserves a separate analysis that links
ideological position and legislative activity, which is not included in the goals of the
current piece.

It is also noteworthy that chances of Committee chairs submitting local
legislation are, on average, 28% less than for every single other legislator. Thus, the
fourth hypothesis is empirically support for prospective municipal heads, as it was the
case of former mayors. The previous analysis alike, a feasible explanation is given by the
greater ability to get legislation passed that makes inflation of bills not as necessary.
Another result that deserves attention is the importance of the provincial dimension in

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