The name is absent

81

When the upper 25% is taken, reelection rate drops to 34%, which diminishes to 30% if
just the upper 10% is considered. This information does not mean anything by itself, but
might give a broad intuition: the higher the population and the expected relevance of a
municipality, the higher the levels of visibility, competitiveness and actors involved.
This might also depress the rates of reelection and increase the incentives for legislators
seeking that position.

So, how likely is it that legislators pursue mayoral positions? Table 6.9 shows
that 6% of representatives in office have immediately sought a municipal executive spot.
Intuitively, if availability of resources is a predictor of career success, politicians' interest
in subnational positions should increase as the municipality becomes wealthier, more ?
populated and has a bigger budget. However, people do not always choose where to «
live or where to start their careers. Thus, a pure rational choice self-selection argument
for municipal positions is definitely not accurate. Politicians tend to seek a mayoral
position in their home municipalities whenever the political Opporhmities are favorable.
However, subjects having reached a national executive position would hardly expect to
become mayors if their districts meant a political jail for them. So, it can be thought that
these district-characteristics should also be a part of the opportunity structures for
political careers. Analyzing the data, the population average of those districts that
legislators have run for is .12. Clearly, the mean is much higher than the average of the
full sample (.01). Thus, having seen that reelection rates diminish as districts become
more relevant, and having realized that legislators in office tend to run mostly for
relevant districts; an empirical realization of legislators' behavior whenever they pursue
a mayor position becomes full of sense.

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