82
Table 6.8: Rate of Reelection of Mayors in the 50%z 75% and 90%
Intervals -1983-2007
|
.. л Upper 50,,o Upper 75% Upper 90% | |||
|
3332 |
1825 |
726 | |
|
63.92 |
65.69 |
69.47 | |
|
,*'v∙'∙∙.-r< ' |
1881 |
953 |
319 |
|
36.08 |
34.31 |
30.53 | |
|
:• '√∙∙'iζ. |
5213 |
2778 |
ÎÔ45 |
|
100 |
100 ~ |
100 | |
Table 6.9: Percentage of Legislators Immediately running for Mayoral
Positions -1983-2007
MayoralCandidate N Percent
|
0 |
1,408 |
93.8 |
|
1 ^~~ |
' 93 |
6.2 |
|
Total |
lz501 |
100 |
Hypotheses
The goal of the present piece exceeds the (undoubtedly) interesting question
about when would a legislator seek subnational positions. It is clear that the likelihood
increases when the opportunities are perceived as favorable. However, I am interested
in unfolding legislators' behavior when they decide to run for a subnational position. To
do so, I will try to disentangle whether bill drafting foresees immediate subnational
executive ambition.
Through the utilization of the database already described, I will use the
immediate pursuit of a gubernatorial or a mayoral position as dependent variables of
my estimations. The principal covariate will be whether each legislator is πmning for a
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