The name is absent

83

gubernatorial or mayoral position at the end of her current legislative mandate (one
model per category). I will keep most of the controls of the previous models: pertinence
to the majority party, pertinence to the governor's party in her province, absolute
distance from the median ideal point in the floor, absolute distance from the median
ideal point in the floor, member of the Peronist party and member of a Provincial party.

Two main hypotheses are stated:

6.1: Legislators seeking a gubernatorial position immediately after their congressional
mandate tend to submit more province-level legislation than their colleagues who do
not

6.2: Legislators expecting an immediate mayoral position tend to submit more
legislation targeting the municipalities of their provinces than their complements.

As in Chapter 5, alternative hypotheses are derived from some of the principal control
covariates:

6.3: The farther away a legislator is from the majority party median ideal point, the
higher the chances of submitting locally-based legislation

6.4: Committee chairs are less likely to submit locally-based legislation

I run two models for each hypothesis, as I did in Chapter 5. First, I employ a
multi-level approach that captures random intercepts at the provincial level. Then, I
employ a Bernoulli-logistic model with clustered standard errors at each legislator's
level. Doing so, I expect to assess the individual-level effects that, I think, are affecting
legislative behavior.

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