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(i.e. president, deputy, or governor for the mayoral case) and attach their ballots to those
of popular candidates. Such a strategy could be beneficial for both parties, as the recent
experience shows40.
Considering the aforementioned favorable scenarios for incumbents, legislators
with subnational executive ambitions should think very well about the structure of
opportunities (Schlesinger 1968) before entering a race. At this stage, no one will doubt
that becoming a governor or the mayor of a relevant city is a better spot than being a
backbencher in Congress. However, when risks are high, seeking any other office might
be Nash equilibrium for a politician at time ti-. Since some of these risks are associated
with relative disadvantage vis-a-vis incumbents; deterrence from entering into the race
should increase as the perceived incumbency advantage also rises.
IncumbencyfDeterrenceandcareerPerspectives
How does incumbency perform at the subnational level? Unlike just minor
exceptions (De Luca 2008), the literature has overlooked the dynamics of subnational
executive careerism in Argentina. In a system where, as stated, ambition is multilevel, it
is almost mandatory to know how the structure of opportunities is shaped. Thus, a key
component of the explanation is to know the extent to which static ambition is a valid
assumption for governors and mayors.
40 The process of territorialization of politics (Gibson 2004, Calvo and Escolar 2005) made subnational
actors even more powerful. Most presidential candidates sought the support of already established
governors and mayors, in order to count with the votes that this reverse coattails effect might track to them.
As a counterpart, the alignment with a presidential candidate might imply that other runner ups for the
Provincialormunicipalpositionberemovedbythehigherofficecandidatejorthattheydecidedto
withdraw from the race, after losing thé expected support by the presidential contender.