73
Governors
Argentine governors are directly elected every four years. Polls mostly use
plurality rule and there is a huge variation in the presence and the length of term limits.
These differences are endogenously shaped by ambition; in fact, many territorial leaders
have altered the rules of the game in their favor during their first periods, in order to
remove pitfalls for staying in office (Calvo and Micozzi 2005). Overall, a tendency
towards Strengtiiening the power of the incumbent governor and/or coalition of power
has been the rule in Argentina.
Between 1983 and 2007, 163 regular elections have taken place for the choice of
governors and, in most districts, also vice-governors41. Since there have been some
discontinuities, special elections and federal interventions, the total number of
gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial positions equals 345 in the period. 242 politicians
occupied these positions, most politicians were elected, but some positions were filled
by provincial legislators in the line of süccession. In the original sample, 189 spots
belonged to a governor, and they were occupied by 133 subjects. Given that governors in
the first period (1983 for most provinces) did not have the chance of reelection before
arriving to the seat, the number of possible incumbents drops to 165.
How have these governors behaved in career terms after their mandates? As it
becomes evident in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, a huge number of governors (three quarters) have
not been immediately reelected overall. The highest contribution to this group is
provided by those unable to pursue reelection due to term limits (86 over 122, a 70%).
4* Some provincial constitutions did not include the figure of the vice-governor. All of those provinces
reformed their rules and created this position no later than 1991.
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