Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls



Profits are maximized with respect to the number of additional home-grown talents,
represented by the parameter
μ , and the number of talents hired from abroad, T21. The
first-order conditions for the decision problem read;

⅛ = αY1 ((1 -α(1 + ε)Tπ)logσ -1)0                           (18)

T21

1 = αY1 ((1 -α(1 + ε)T21)logσ -1>5/e1 -c 0                      (19)

∂μ

It is easy to see from these first-order conditions that if an interior solution for the number
of imported talents hold,
T21 0, no additional talents will be raised at home, i.e.
μ = 0. The optimal import of talents can then easily be derived from (18) as:

T21 = (1 - ɪ)-ɪ-                             (20)

logσ α(1 +ε)

Table 6. Home-grown rule, players’ allocation and welfare*)

λ

T1

t21

T2

Whg

Wtr

„ *

W____

α = 0.5; σ = 7

0.86

0.84

0.14

0.23

658.8

674.0

674.7

α = 0.5; σ = 11

0.83

0.83

0.17

0.35

690.2

696.9

698.3

α = 0.5; σ = 15

0.81

0.81

0.19

0.42

712.8

716.9

718.3

α = 0.9; σ = 7

0.65

0.35

0.19

0.29

684.1

685.7

685.7

α = 0.9; σ = 11

0.68

0.44

0.21

0.42

715.8

718.6

718.8

α = 0.9; σ = 15

0.70

0.49

0.21

0.51

742.6

746.1

746.2

*)The value of the parameters used for this calculation

are: N

=100, N2 =50. λis the minimum home-

grown rule for which the small league 2 finds it advantageous to train talents, T1

is the number of players

trained in country 1, T21 ( T2 )

is the number of players trained

in league 2 and playing

in league 1 (2).

Whg, Wtr , W*

are welfare under the

home-grown rule,

the transfer-rate

system

and the social

optimum, respectively

What remains to be considered is how high the required home-grown rate λ has to be in
order to make it advantageous for league 2 to have training facilities of their own. For a
too low value of
λ league 2 will lose ‘too many’ of its talents and not start training
facilities and play with mediocre talented players only. Actually, it turns out with our
sample of parameters that if
α= 0.1 league 1’s demand for foreign talents for any
λ< 1will be such that the small league will have no incentive to start training their

22



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