Macroeconomic Interdependence in a Two-Country DSGE Model under Diverging Interest-Rate Rules



A. Appendix

with {λ}s=t denoting a sequence of Lagrange multipliers.

∂ Λ t
∂Ct


Ct-ρ - λt(-1) = 0,


∂ Λ t
∂Mt
∂ Λ t
∂Bt
∂ Λ t
∂Lt
∂ Λ t
∂λt


χM P-λt(-P)-E


λt +1

P+ +1.


-λt -~ P, )- β (1+it ) Et [+τ ] =0


γLt-


Wt
λt- = 0,
t Pt


Wt              Bt-1

L~+t + (1 + it- 1 ) p

Pt           Pt


Mt-1

+ Pt


, Γ t ( h )
+ Pt


0,


- Ct


Mt
Pt


Bt
Pt


- τt


= 0.


From the first partial derivative one obtains Ct-ρ = t and therefore Ct-+ρ1 = t+1. Plugging this into
the fourth one, one gets equation (20):

L-ξ _W

γc-ρ   Pt '

Now, by using Ct-ρ = t and Ct-+ρ1 = t+1, one obtains from the third partial derivative equation
(18):

Ct +1


Pt+1


c-ρ

—P— = β (1 + it ) Et
Pt

Finally, plugging the above expression into the second partial derivative, one obtains equation (19):

^MtΛ
Pj



Ct


it

.

1 + it


A.3. Equilibrium Conditions on World Bond and Goods Markets

The subsequent derivation is based on Obstfeld/Rogoff (2001, pp. 7-9), which itself is based on
reasoning by Corsetti/Pesenti (2001, pp. 430-433).

Start with the market clearing condition for a single good z:

Yt ( : )= nCt ( г ) + (1 - n ) C* ( г ).

Assuming, for instance, that good z is a typical domestic good such that z = h [0, n] and multiplying
the preceding equation with
Pt (h) one obtains:

Pt(h)Yt(h) = nPt(h)Ct(h) + (1 - n)Pt(h)Ct*(h).

Taking the integral from 0 to n and using equations (6) and (10) yields:

Pt(h)Yt(h)dh


= nPt,H Ct,H + (1


- n)Pt,H Ct*,H


Because of equations (12) and (14) this expression implies:

Pt(h)Yt(h)dh


= n2PtCt + (1


- n)nPtCt* = nPtCtw,


where the right-hand side of the above equation denotes global demand for domestic goods in domestic
currency. Since
Y denotes domestic per-capita output, the left-hand side of the equation can alternatively

31



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