Monopolistic Pricing in the Banking Industry: a Dynamic Model



Solution of the system

Defining Xt = g3rD - g4rB, the first equation can be rewritten as:


Dt =


Yy β


(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]
βγγ + [(1 - q ) «


E [ Ft]


- 1]


(1 - q ) [yy β - [1 - (1 - q ) «


________[1 - (1 - q ) «]________f +

(1 - q)[yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]] t


] NW -


Yy β


[yy β - [1 - (1 - q)«


Xt +


________1 - (1 - q ) «________E [ ɪ z ]
(1
- q)[yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]] -α t+1-∣'


(70)


Substituting the former in the other equation, we obtain a second order difference equation in
E[Ft].


Yy β


(1 - q) [yY β - [1 - (1 - q) «


E [ Ft +1]


[1 - (1 - q ) «]            ,

--------;:—z----------------------fΓ+ +

(1 - q)[yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


βγγ + [(1 - q)« -1]


(1 - q ) [yY β - [1 - (1 - q ) « «


NW -


Yy β


[yY β - [1 - (1 - q ) «]


Xt +


Yy


Yy β


1 - «(1 - q ) (1 - q ) [yY β - [1 - (1 - q ) «]


Ft


Yy


Yy β


1 - «(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


Xt-1


________1 - (1 - q ) «________E [ ɪ z ] =
(1
- q)[yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]   -α t+1-∣


Yy


[1 - (1 - q ) «]


1 - «(1 - q) (1 - q) [yY β - [1 - (1 - q) «


Ft-1 +


Yy


βγγ + [(1 - q)« -1]


1 - «(1 - q ) (1 - q ) [yY β - [1 - (1 - q ) « ]


NW +


Yy


1 - (1 - q ) «


1 - «(1 - q) (1 - q)α[γYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


+

-i---«---FFt + i---«---^W +  ---X----. (71)

1 - «(1 - q)      1 - «(1 - q)        1 - «(1 - q)


It can be expressed as:


E [ Ft +1 ]


[1 - (1 - q ) « ]r, ,

-------F----Ft+

Yy β


«

1 - « (1 - q )


(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


1 - «YY - q) Ft + 1


Yy


Yy β

[1 - (1 - q)«]


- « (1 - q )     γγ β


Ft +


Ft-1 =


(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


Yy β


Yy


C--γ

L 1 - « (1 - q )

Yy β


+1


βγγ + [(1 - q) « - 1]


(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q) «


NW + ɪ


Yy


«(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]
1
- (1 - q ) «


_ _ _

1 - «(1 - q) (1 - q) [yY β - [1 - (1 - q) «


Xt-1 +


Yy β


[yyβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


Xt + τ


«

« (1 - q )

1


NW +


- «(1 - q)


Xt +


E [1 ] Zt + ∩----ʧ 12 - (1 - q)«----∏TE [1 Zt +1] . (72)

LaJ (1 - q) yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]J   La -l


We now study separately the left-hand side.


E [ Ft]


[1 - (1 - q)«]


1 - «YY - q )Ft + 1


Yy β

Yy


Ft + I----«----1

1 - «(1 - q)


[1 - (1 - q)«]


- « (1 - q )     γγ β


(1 - q) [yYβ - [1 - (1 - q)«]]


Yy β


Ft +


Ft-1 = E[Ft] - [—- + γγ] Ft + -ιl- 1.   (73)

Lγγβ     J β


24




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