vis the status-signaling one and on the desirability of the public goods financed by
charity (the magnitude of the parameter α in our model).
The distinction between the conflicting tax implications of the two
contributions motives raises the possibility of designing a system of differential tax
treatment of contributions depending on whether they are anonymous or not. When
contributions are anonymous, they indicate that they are driven by altruism.
Therefore, a favorable tax treatment may be targeted toward the latter. Note further
that the ability to signal status via 'charitable' contributions hinges crucially on the
assumption that such contributions are indeed observable. The role of status-signaling
in mitigating the free-rider problem may call for policy measures aimed at facilitating
the dissemination of such information and rendering it more observable; see the
related discussion of Cooter and Broughman (2005), suggesting a donation registry of
the IRS via the internet.
21
More intriguing information
1. Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power2. Centre for Longitudinal Studies
3. Sex-gender-sexuality: how sex, gender, and sexuality constellations are constituted in secondary schools
4. Dendritic Inhibition Enhances Neural Coding Properties
5. Short- and long-term experience in pulmonary vein segmental ostial ablation for paroxysmal atrial fibrillation*
6. The name is absent
7. Concerns for Equity and the Optimal Co-Payments for Publicly Provided Health Care
8. The name is absent
9. Implementation of a 3GPP LTE Turbo Decoder Accelerator on GPU
10. Innovation Trajectories in Honduras’ Coffee Value Chain. Public and Private Influence on the Use of New Knowledge and Technology among Coffee Growers