Table 9 - Estimations for Fitch: two sub-periods
|
________Pooled OLS________ |
Random Effects |
Fixed Effects | ||||
|
1996-2000 |
2001-2005 |
1996-2000 |
2001-2005 |
1996-2000 |
2001-2005 | |
|
Constant |
4.953*** |
1.732 |
7.160*** |
7.783*** |
11.149*** |
10.637*** |
|
(2.96) |
(1.15) |
(12.04) |
(14.13) |
(144.80) |
(17.37) | |
|
GDP per capita |
2.201*** |
1.030*** |
1.881*** |
1.197*** |
2.014*** |
1.354*** |
|
(2.92) |
(3.02) |
(3.61) |
(6.00) |
(4.00) |
(5.92) | |
|
GDP per capita Avg. |
0.403* |
0.960*** | ||||
|
(1.93) |
(4.94) | |||||
|
GDP growth |
-2.392 |
3.377 | ||||
|
(-0.79) |
(0.88) | |||||
|
GDP growth Avg. | ||||||
|
Unemployment | ||||||
|
Unemployment Avg. | ||||||
|
Inflation |
-0.233** |
-7.223*** |
-0.098 |
-1.086 | ||
|
(-2.12) |
(-5.06) |
(-1.01) |
(-0.73) | |||
|
Inflation Avg. |
-0.364*** |
-7.316*** | ||||
|
(-3.20) |
(-4.97) | |||||
|
Gov Debt |
-0.046*** |
-0.027*** |
-0.039*** |
-0.021* |
-0.036*** |
-0.015 |
|
(-4.19) |
(-3.99) |
(-5.81) |
(-1.85) |
(-4.09) |
(-0.78) | |
|
Gov Debt Avg. |
-0.008* |
-0.010** | ||||
|
(-1.67) |
(-2.24) | |||||
|
Gov Balance |
0.852 |
6.226* | ||||
|
(0.22) |
(1.84) | |||||
|
Gov Balance Avg. |
12.422*** |
0.503 | ||||
|
(3.26) |
(0.12) | |||||
|
Gov Effectiveness |
1.490*** |
-0.907** |
0.714*** |
0.298 |
0.545** |
0.294 |
|
(3.60) |
(-2.09) |
(3.26) |
(1.04) |
(2.15) |
(1.15) | |
|
Gov Effectiveness Avg. |
1.958*** |
1.461*** |
2.628*** |
2.771*** | ||
|
(8.59) |
(6.37) |
(6.28) |
(8.20) | |||
|
External Debt |
-0.001 |
-0.008*** |
-0.001 |
-0.008** |
-0.001 |
-0.008* |
|
(-0.28) |
(-2.76) |
(-0.23) |
(-2.26) |
(-0.22) |
(-1.78) | |
|
External Debt Avg. |
-0.008*** |
-0.012*** |
-0.010*** |
-0.014*** | ||
|
(-4.34) |
(-5.35) |
(-2.68) |
(-3.51) | |||
|
Current Account | ||||||
|
Current Account Avg. | ||||||
|
Reserves | ||||||
|
Reserves Avg. |
2.313*** |
2.225*** |
2.557** |
2.696*** | ||
|
(3.42) |
(4.16) |
(2.40) |
(3.45) | |||
|
Def 1 |
-0.717** |
-1.409** |
-1.440*** |
-1.338** |
-1.848** |
-0.970 |
|
(-2.22) |
(-5.32) |
(-3.02) |
(-2.36) |
(-2.43) |
(-0.97) | |
|
Def 2 | ||||||
|
EU |
0.843*** |
0.959*** |
0.841* |
0.579** | ||
|
(2.92) |
(4.45) |
(1.67) |
(2.34) | |||
|
IND |
2.953*** |
1.359*** |
2.883*** |
2.146*** | ||
|
(5.48) |
(2.89) |
(2.96) |
(3.39) | |||
|
LAC |
-1.017*** |
-0.917*** | ||||
|
(-3.84) |
(-4.17) | |||||
|
R2 |
0.943 |
0.969 |
0.932 |
0.957 |
0.990 |
0.993 |
|
Countries |
54 |
58 |
54 |
58 |
54 |
58 |
|
Observations |
235 |
246 |
235 |
246 |
235 |
246 |
|
Hausman Test $________ |
6.95 (0.325) |
11.25 (0.128) | ||||
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. $ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 8 and 7 degrees of freedom respectively (the variable EU (2) is time invariant in the
second sample). The p-value is in brackets.
41
More intriguing information
1. The Dictator and the Parties A Study on Policy Co-operation in Mineral Economies2. The name is absent
3. Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment
4. The storage and use of newborn babies’ blood spot cards: a public consultation
5. LABOR POLICY AND THE OVER-ALL ECONOMY
6. The urban sprawl dynamics: does a neural network understand the spatial logic better than a cellular automata?
7. Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations
8. APPLICATIONS OF DUALITY THEORY TO AGRICULTURE
9. The name is absent
10. The name is absent